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Adoption was unknown at common iW alk4 did not
become part of statutory law in the Unitecl ,tates 01161
the mid to late nineteenth century. Th first moderti
adoption act was enacted in Massachusetts in 1851,
oddly enough with little fanfare or public notice. Not
only did the act depart from English law, which had
long prohibited permanent transfer of parental rights
and obligations to third persons; the act also specified
that the child was the prime beneficiary of the adop-
tion process. When considering whether to approve an
adoption petition, the court would determine whether
approval would serve the child's interests.
Today all states have statutes providing for adop-
tion of children. The various acts are marked by both
similarities and significant differences because efforts at
nationwide uniformity have largely failed. Only five
states have enacted the 1969 Revised Uniform Adoption
Act, and only one state (Vermont) has enacted the
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in statutory language from state to state
may affect the outcome in adoption cases presenting
apparently sinilar facts. Because of similarities among
adoption acts, however, lawyers handling an adoption
should remain alert to other jurisdictions' statutory and
decisional law, which may provide persuasive authority.
Where parties to an adoption proceeding reside in dif-
ferent states, conflict of laws rules may also require
application of another jurisdiction's adoption law.
Between 2% and 4% of American families have an
adopted child. Courts grant at least 140,000 to 160,000
adoptions annually (that is, considerably more than a
million each decade), though estimates remain inexact
because the Census Bureau, other federal agencies, and
most states do not systematically track the total
number. Accurate records are maintained only of
international adoptees who enter the United States
with the cooperation of immigration authorities, and of
"special needs" children who receive federal and
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state assistance.
In 1997, the President of the American Bar
Association reported that "[a] cross our nation, in every
state, hundreds of thousands of children spend each day
waiting in foster care, housed with temporary caretakers
as wards of the state. These are not unwanted children.
Though their biological parents may not be willing or
able to care for the children, often others would gladly
take legal custody through adoption if they were able to
complete the process." The President reported one com-
mon obstacle to adoption - "a shortage of qualified
lawyers who can help families on a pro bono or
reduced-fee basis" - and urged the organized bar to
recruit and train lawyers for service. N. Lee Cooper, Free
the Children: A Cumbersome Adoption Process is
Keeping Families Apart, 83 A.B.A.J. 8 (May 1997).
Strict and Liberal Construction
Reciting the historical pedigree of American adop-
tion law, many decisions hold that adoption statutes are
in derogation of the common law and thus are strictly
construed. On the other hand, many adoption statutes
mandate liberal construction to further the best inter-
ests of the child.
Even where liberal construction controls interpre-
tation of substantive adoption provisions, courts may
strictly construe procedural provisions, which are
designed to protect the child by enabling the court to
decide based on the most complete information
available. Much adoption procedure is set out in a state's
adoption act itself. Because adoption is a civil
proceeding, the state's general civil procedure code
and general civil court rules may govern procedural
matters not explicitly addressed in the adoption code,
including matters relating to service of process, plead-
ings, discovery, conduct of the proceeding, and post-
proceeding matters.
The Effect of Adoption
Adoption is "the legal equivalent of biological par-
enthood." Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. 816,844 n.51 (1977).
Except where the adoptive parent is a stepparent or
other partner of the birth parent, a valid adoption per-
manently and irrevocably extinguishes the parent-child
relationship between the child and the birth parents
and creates a new relationship between the child and
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the adoptive parents. Where the adoptive parent is a
stepparent or partner, the adoptive parent replaces the
birth parent whose rights have been terminated
but the child's relationship with the other birth
parent continues.
Adoptive parents thus assume the constitutional
rights of parenthood, including the due process right to
direct the child's upbringing. The adoptive parents and
the adoptee also secure new rights and obligations
under a variety of federal and state laws, including tax
laws, workers' compensation laws, social security and
other entitlement laws, welfare laws, inheritance laws,
and family leave laws. See, e.g., Buchea v. United States,
154 E3d 1114, 1116 (9th Cir. 1998) (girl could not sue
for her biological father's wrongful death because she
had previously been adopted by her maternal grandpar-
ents and thus was no longer the birth father's "child").
Incest statutes are a major exception to the princi-
ple that a valid adoption extinguishes the child's rela-
tionship with the biological parents. Under statutes pro-
hibiting marriage or sexual relations between parent
and child, brothers and sisters, and other close relatives
of the whole or half blood, proof that one of the parties
had been validly adopted is not a defense to an incest
prosecution. See, e.g., State v. Sharon H., 429 A.2d 1321
(Del.Super.Ct.1981).
WHO MAY ADOPT A CHILD?
Statutory Standing and the
"Best Interests of the Child" Test
A child is adopted only when the court enters a
final decree approving the adoption. The court enters
the decree only when it determines that adoption by a
petitioner or petitioners with standing to adopt would
be in the best interests of the child.
As a general matter, adoption acts confer standing
on married couples petitioning jointly, stepparents wish-
ing to adopt their stepchildren, and frequently on single
persons. Courts determine the best interests of the child
by examining the circumstances of the case, including
the conditions of the prospective adoptive parents and
the child.
"[C]ourts have not demanded perfection in adop-
tive parents." In re Michael JJ, 613 N.YS.2d 715, 716
(App.Div.1994). Adoption may be in the child's best
interests, for example, even where the prospective adop-
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tive parents have relatively modest means. Adoption
seeks to "provide the best home that is available. By that
is not meant the wealthiest home, but the home
which... the court deems will best promote the welfare of
the particular child." State ex rel. St. Louis Children's Aid
Society v. Hughes, 177 S.W2d 474,477 (Mo.1944).
An adoption petition is not necessarily defeated by
the prospective adoptive parents' nondisclosure or mis-
representation in connection with the adoption. In In re
Baby Girl W, 542 N.YS.2d 415, 416 (App.Div.1989), for
example, the court approved the adoption even though
the petitioners misrepresented their educational back-
grounds, employment histories and financial condition
during the preadoption investigation, and equivocated
when asked to explain discrepancies.The court conclud-
ed that adoption was in the best interests of the child
because "the petitioners' character flaws are offset by their
proven ability to care for the child."
Even a prospective adoptive parent's criminal record
does not necessarily defeat the adoption petition. In In re
Alison V 621 N.YS.2d 739, 739-40 (App.Div. 1995), for
example, the court held that the 34-year-old petitioner's
convictions for disorderly conduct and hindering prose-
cution when she was seventeen years old did not preclude
her from being considered as an adoptive parent because
she had engaged in no further criminal activity, had been
steadily employed by the same employer for twelve years,
and had been a foster parent. A more recent conviction,
however, or one involving substance abuse or misconduct
with children, might be a different matter.
The best-interests-of-the-child standard means that the
ultimate question is whether the proposed adoption
would serve the child's welfare, and not whether it would
serve the welfare of the birth parents, the prospective
adoptive parents or anyone else. For example, the court
should not be moved by pleas that the infertile
prospective adoptive parents need a child for their
emotional wellbeing, or to help shore up their shaky
marriage. Some critics charge that in recent years, howev-
er, adoption law has frequently focused not on the best
interests of the child but on the interests of childless




Most states require married couples to petition
jointly unless the petitioner is the child's stepparent.
Some states permit single persons to petition to adopt a
child. Two single persons, however, normally may not
petition jointly. See, e.g., In re Jason C. (N.H.1987).
Stepparents
Most stepparents do not adopt their stepchildren
because they cannot unless the parental rights of the
noncustodial birth parent are terminated by consent or
court order. Most stepparent adoptions involve stepfa-
thers adopting their wives' children born in or out of
wedlock. Because an uncontested stepparent adoption
generally gives the law's imprimatur to a family struc-
ture already in existence, adoption acts often exempt
these adoptions from requirements relating to confiden-
tiality, home studies, probationary periods, and similar
matters. Critics warn, however, that exemption and
relaxation may prevent the court from discovering child
abuse in the home.
What if the surviving stepparent wishes to adopt
the child of his deceased spouse? If no competing peti-
tion is filed, the court would likely approve the adoption
unless the stepparent appears unfit. If a close relative
also petitions to adopt the child, however, the steppar-
ent may lose because he (like the close relative) is a legal
stranger to the child. The stepparent's position would
appear most tenuous where the law grants the relative a
preference. On the other hand, the stepparent's position
would appear stronger if the child has resided with him
for a significant period and if uprooting would likely
cause the child psychological harm. The best-interests-
of-the-child standard would determine the outcome.
Grandparents and other relatives
Grandparents or other relatives sometimes seek to
adopt a child whose birth parents have died, have had
their parental rights terminated, or have become unable
to care for the child because of physical or mental dis-
ability, substance abuse or other cause. A relative holds
no substantive due process right to adopt the child after
the birth parents' deaths or termination of their parental
rights. See, e.g., Mullins v. State, 57 E3d 789 (9th Cir.
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1995).The relative's blood relation to the child, howev-
er, is a factor to consider in determining the best inter-
ests of the child. See, e.g., Dunn v. Dunn, 380 S.E.2d 836,
837 (S.C.1989).
Some decisions grant relatives a preference. See,
e.g., In re D.L., 486 N.W2d 375, 379 (Minn.1992). In
most states, however, a relative holds a preference only
where the statute or applicable rule grants one. See, e.g.,
In re Adoption of Hess, 608 A.2d 10, 13 (Pa.1992). The
preference usually depends on the relative's prior rela-
tionship with the child. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 63.0425
(where child placed for adoption has lived with the
grandparent for at least six months, the grandparent has
first priority to adopt the grandchild unless the deceased
parent has indicated a different preference by will or
unless the stepparent wishes to adopt). Courts, however,
show a marked inclination to honor the wishes of birth
parents to place a child with otherwise fit relatives.
Foster parents
A substantial number of adoptions each year are by
the child's foster parents. Until relatively recently, public
and private child placement agencies often required
prospective foster parents, as a condition for receiving
temporary custody of a child, to agree in writing not to
seek to adopt the child.The purpose was to discourage
emotional bonding while the agency sought to reunify
the child with the biological family or to free the child
for adoption.
The traditional attitude has largely changed. Where
foster parents petition to adopt, courts tend to refuse to
enforce no-adoption agreements where adoption by the
foster parents is in the best interests of the child. See,
e.g., Knight v. Deavers, 531 S.W2d 252 (Ark.1976).
Courts and child welfare professionals alike now recog-
nize that where a child has spent much of his or her
young life in foster care, arbitrary removal from the fos-
ter home for adoption by strangers may cause the child
added hardship from severing a secure relationship.The
hardship may be severe because many foster children
already suffer from emotional or physical disability, fre-
quently worsened by severed relationships before the
adoption petition is filed.
Some statutes grant a preference to foster parents
who have cared for the child for a specified period,
though the court retains ultimate authority to grant or
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deny the adoption in the best interests of the child. See,
e.g., N.Y Social Servs. Law § 383(3) (more than two
years). Where adoption by foster parents is in the best
interests of the child, the court may grant the petition
even where a blood relative of the child files a compet-
ing petition. See, e.g., Petition of Dep't of Social Servs.,
491 N.E.2d 270 (Mass.Ct.App. 1986) (three-year-old child's
best interests served by adoption by foster parents with
whom she had been placed when she was four days old
rather than by the paternal aunt and uncle).
Where the adoption agency's consent is necessary for
adoption, its refusal to consent to adoption by the foster
parents may defeat the petition. In most states that address
such consent, however, agency refusal is persuasive only
and the court may decide in the best interests of the child.
See, e.g., State ex rel. Dep't of Institutions, Social and
Rehabilitative Servs. v. Griffis, 545 P2d 763 (Okla. 1975).
The pelitioners' age
In most states, a person must be eighteen or older to
adopt a child, at least unless he or she is the child's step-
parent or is married to an adult petitioner. Some states
establish a higher minimum age. See, e.g., Ga. Code § 19-8-
3 (twenty-five). A few states prescribe no minimum age,
leaving it to the courts to determine on a case-by-case
basis whether adoption by a minor would be in the best
interests of the prospective adoptee.
Where the adoption act precludes minors from adopt-
ing a child but does not specify that a married minor may
adopt, the act's silence does not necessarily disable mar-
ried minors from adopting. Marriage emancipates a minor,
and emancipation confers rights of adulthood.
When older persons petition to adopt children, courts
decide in accordance with the best interests standard
because adoption statutes do not establish a maximum
permissible age. The court may be concerned that older
petitioners might be physically incapable of raising a
young child, or that their death or serious illness would
leave the child orphaned.
Where the petitioners are the child's grandparents or
other relatives, the factors discussed above come into play.
In In re Adoption of Christian, 184 S.2d 657, 658
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1966), for example, the court approved a
68-year-old grandmother's petition to adopt her 13-year-
old granddaughter. On the other hand, in Sonet v.
Unknown Father, 797 S.W2d 1, 5 (Tenn.Ct.App.1990), a
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woman approximately seventy years old petitioned to
adopt a child who was nearly three; the court denied the
petition based on the petitioner's age, her lack of parent-
ing ability with no foreseeable improvement, and the
child's failure to thrive in her care.
Gays and lesbians
One member of a gay or lesbian partnership may
wish to adopt the other's child, who may have been con-
ceived by reproductive technology or who may be the
biological or adoptive child of the other's prior hetero-
sexual marital or extramarital relationship. In In re Angel
Lace M., 516 N.W2d 678 (Wis. 1994), the sharply divided
court held that the adoption act granted the lesbian
companion no standing to adopt, regardless of whether
adoption might be in the best interests of the child.
Other courts, however, have found standing under their
state acts. See, e.g., In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397
(N.Y1995); Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E,2d 315
(Mass. 1993).
As individuals or couples, gays or lesbians may also
wish to adopt children of persons other than their part-
ners. Two states expressly prohibit homosexuals or
same-sex couples from adopting children. See Fla. Stat. §
63.042(3); Miss. Code Ann. § 93-17-3(2). Utah also evi-
dently prohibits adoption of a child by homosexuals
because the state permits adoption only by persons
legally married to each other, or by single persons not
living in a cohabitation relationship outside marriage.
See Utah Code § 78-30-1(3). In other states, courts apply
the best interests test to determine whether to grant
adoption petitions filed by gays or lesbians with stand-
ing to adopt.
Disabled petitioners
Several states have outlawed discrimination against
disabled adoption petitioners. Typical is Wis. Stat. §
48.82(5): "Although otherwise qualified, no person shall
be denied [eligibility to adopt a child] because the per-
son is deaf, blind or has other physical handicaps."
Adoption of siblings
Neither the United States Supreme Court nor any
state supreme court has articulated a constitutional
right of a child not to be separated from his or her
siblings in adoption. Nor does any statute prohibit, or
create a presumption against, adoption of siblings into
separate homes.
The rationale for avoiding separation of siblings is
straightforward. "Young brothers and sisters need each
other's strengths and association in their everyday and
often common experiences, and to separate them,
unnecessarily, is likely to be traumatic and harmful. The
importance of rearing brothers and sisters together, and
thereby nourishing their familial bonds, is also strength-
ened by the likelihood that the parents will pass away
before their children." Obey v. Degling, 337 N.E.2d 601,
602 (N.Y 1975)."[Wlhen these children become adults,
they will have only each other to depend on." In re
Patricia Ann W, 392 N.YS.2d 180, 187
(N.YFam.Ct. 1977).
Sometimes, however, courts and authorities are torn
between the desire to keep siblings together and the dif-
ficulty of finding adoptive parents willing and able to
adopt siblings together.The children's longterm interest
in sibling association may yield to their shortterm inter-
est in leaving foster care for permanent adoption into
available homes. A child's special needs may also affect
the outcome. See, e.g., Morgan v, Department of Social
Services, 313 S.E.2d 350, 353-54 (S.C.Ct.App.1984)
(ordering adoption by foster parents who had helped
cure girl of severe emotional problems, though other
parents had adopted her half-brothers).
The adoption touchstone remains the best interests
of the child. "[A] sibling relationship is but one factor,
albeit an important one, that a judge should consider in
custody cases." Adoption of Hugo, 700 N.E.2d 516, 524
(Mass. 1998). Courts hearing adoption petitions
acknowledge that" [w]herever possible brothers and sis-
ters should be kept together." In re L.B.T., 318 N.W2d
200,202 (Iowa 1982).The principle also applies to half-
siblings. See, e.g., Crouse v. Crouse, 552 N.W2d 413,418
(S.D. 1996).
Courts, however, separate 35,000 children from
their brothers and sisters in foster and adoptive homes
each year. See William Wesley Patton and Sara Latz,
Severing Hansel from Gretel: An Analysis of Siblings'
Association Rights, 48 U. Miami L. Rev. 745, 754-60
(1994). According to some estimates, 75% of sibling
groups end up separated after they enter foster care, and
a greater number of former foster children search for
their siblings than for their birth parents. See National
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Adoption Information Clearinghouse, www.calib.
com/naic/pubs/fLsiblin.htm (visited June 10, 2001).
Courts have sometimes granted separated siblings
visitation rights with each other. See, e.g., In re Adoption
of Anthony, 448 N.YS.2d 377, 381 (Fam.Ct. 1982). Post-
adoption visitation orders opposed by the adoptive par-
ents, however, will face careful constitutional scrutiny
after the parents' rights analysis in Troxel v. Granville,
530 U.S. 57 (2000). In Troxel, all nine Justices reaffirmed
that parents hold a substantive due process right to
direct their children's upbringing, and six Justices (the
plurality and dissenting Justices Stevens and Kennedy)
concluded that third-party visitation cases require a
case-by-case weighing of interests, with the parents'
interest and wishes counting heavily.
"Equitable Adoption"
Suppose an adult agrees to adopt a child but fails to
complete the adoption process and secure an adoption
decree.The child lives in the adult's household, and the
adult raises and educates the child and holds him out as
a family member. If the adult dies intestate, may the child
inherit? Some states would refuse to recognize the adop-
tion for failure to comply with statutory directives.
Denying inheritance may produce a harsh result, how-
ever, perhaps leaving the child in economic distress
while property passes to more distant relatives by oper-
ation of law.
More than half the states recognize the equitable
adoption doctrine, sometimes also called adoption by
estoppel, virtual adoption or de facto adoption. The doc-
trine enables courts to enforce agreements to adopt
where the adult failed to complete the adoption process
through negligence or design, and thus where no court
ever decreed the adoption. The agreement may be with
the child, the child's birth parents, or someone in
loco parentis.
Most claimants invoking the equitable adoption
doctrine seek to share in the intestate adult's estate,
though courts have also applied the doctrine in suits to
recover damages for the adult's wrongful death, recover
support from the adult, establish adoptive status under
inheritance tax laws, or recover life insurance, workers'
compensation or other death benefits following the
adult's death. The adult might also seek to invoke the
doctrine, for example in suits seeking damages for the
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child's wrongful death. In some jurisdictions recogniz-
ing the doctrine, however, courts hold that only the
child may invoke it. See, e.g., Halterman v. Halterman,
867 S.W2d 559 (NMo.Ct.App.1993).
Equitable adoption does not confer adoptive status
but, consistent with the maxim that equity regards as
done that which ought to be done, merely confers the
benefit the claimant seeks. Contract law has been the
basis of most decisions recognizing equitable adoption.
The claimant must prove (1) the adult's express or
implied agreement to adopt the child, (2) the child's
reliance on the agreement, (3) performance by the
child's biological parents in relinquishing custody, (4)
performance by the child in living in the adults' home
and acting as their child, and (5) partial performance by
the adults in taking the child into their home and treat-
ing the child as their own. See, e.g., Lankford v. Wright,
489 S.E.2d 604,606-07 (N.C.1997).
A handful of courts, however, reject the contract
basis as frequently harmful to the best interests of the
child. Even in the absence of an express or implied
agreement to adopt, these decisions find equitable adop-
tion "when a close relationship, similar to parent-child,
exists" and the parties have acted for years as if the child
had been adopted.Atkinson v.Atkinson, 408 N.W2d 516,
520 (Mich.Ct.App. 1987).
In jurisdictions that recognize equitable adoption
based on contract law, the judicial embrace has nonethe-
less been lukewarm, and claimants are rarely successful
in establishing the requisite agreement to adopt. Where
the suit asserting equitable adoption is filed after the
putative adoptive parent's death, courts are wary of
fraudulent claims. Most jurisdictions require the
claimant to prove the agreement by a heightened stan-
dard of proof, such as clear, cogent and convincing evi-
dence. The heightened standard may be satisfied with-
out particular difficulty where the agreement is in writ-




Agency Adoptions and Private
Placements
Particularly where the birth parents and the
prospective adoptive parents are not related, intermedi-
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aries generally facilitate the adoption process.The inter-
mediary may be a public or private adoption agency, or
may be a private person such as a lawyer, member of the
clergy or physician.
Agency adoptions
In every state, an adoption may be completed
through a state agency, or through a private child place-
ment agency (sectarian or non-sectarian) licensed and
regulated by statute. In recent years, most agency adop-
tions have concerned children who have special needs
under applicable federal and state guidelines or who are
older or otherwise difficult to place.
In an agency adoption of a newborn, the birth moth-
er typically consents to termination of her parental
rights and relinquishes custody of the child to the
agency for adoption after receiving counseling about
her options and the consequences of her decision, and
after the agency secures information concerning the
medical, genetic and health history of the child and the
birth parents. If the mother consents before the child's
birth, the adoption act generally requires that she reaf-
firm that consent within a short period after birth. The
child remains in the agency's custody until placement
with the adoptive parents.The agency tries to locate the
father and secure his consent to termination of his
parental rights, but does not deny services to birth
mothers who refuse to name the father. If efforts to
locate the father prove fruitless, the agency must move
for involuntary termination. The agency's counseling of
the birth mother should continue after placement.
During the adoption process and afterwards, the
agency should also counsel the adoptive parents con-
cerning the process and the changes adoption will like-
ly make in their lives. The agency's eligibility standards
for prospective adoptive parents may exclude persons
based on such factors as age, marital status, race, reli-
gion, financial stability and emotional health. At one
time, even discrimination based on outward appear-
ances was encouraged because adoption was deemed
an inferior way to constitute a family. if parents and child
looked sufficiently alike and were within a particular
age range, agencies and courts made it easier for the
family to hide the fact that an adoption had occurred.
Nowadays officially sanctioned discrimination is the
exception rather than the rule throughout American life,
and Congress has even mandated an end to race match-
ing in adoption (see infra § F). Discrimination in adop-
tion resists eradication, however, because it frequently
results from exercise of agency discretion rather than
from written rules and regulations. See generally Jana B.
SingerThe Privatization of Family Law, 1992 Wis. L. Rev.
1443.
Fees charged by adoption agencies have risen sub-
stantially in recent years and now can run as high as
$7,000 to $10,000 or more, with the highest fees being
charged by private agencies. Joan Heifetz Hollinger,
Introduction toAdoption Law and Practice § 1.05 [3] [a], at
1-67, in 1 HollingerAdoption Law and Practice (2000).
Private placements
A private placement adoption is arranged without
an agency by the birth mother dealing with the prospec-
tive adoptive parents either directly or through a lawyer,
member of the clergy, physician or other intermediary.
Most states facilitate private placements by permitting
advertising by persons wishing to adopt.
All states permit private placement adoptions by
stepparents or other members of the child's familyAll but
a handful of states also permit private placements to
adoptive parents unrelated to the child. Even in the few
states that prohibit non-relative private placements, birth
parents may sometimes reach agreement privately with
the prospective adoptive parents, and then work with an
agency to direct the child to the designated persons.
In recent years, most healthy infants adopted by
nonrelatives have been adopted in private placements,
which normally do not provide the counseling that
agencies offer birth parents and adoptive parents. The
steadily increasing volume of private adoptions, howev-
er, is fueled in part by frustration with agencies' long
waiting lists, restrictive guidelines, and sometimes intru-
sive investigations.A major reason for the increase is the
contemporary shortage of adoptable children without
special needs, and the resulting intense competition for
these children among desirous adoptive parents.
The shortage of healthy infants available for adop-
tion stems from several factors. Abortion and birth con-
trol are more widely available to unmarried women than
in the past. Unmarried birth mothers today are also
much more likely to keep their babies because the stig-
ma of single parenthood and out-of-wedlock births has
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markedly diminished in the past generation. An estimat-
ed 97% or more of unmarried women who deliver
babies now choose to keep the child. As a result,
prospective adoptive couples outnumber adoptable
children by at least 20 to 1 and, according to some esti-
mates, considerably higher. The odds are particularly
daunting for would-be adoptive parents disfavored by
agencies, such as older couples and single persons.
In private placements, adoptive parents may pay as
much as $20,000, including their legal fees, the birth
mother's legal fees and maternity-related expenses.
Some observers believe that in some private place-
ments, "under the table" payments may increase the
amount considerably.
Baby Selling
Most states have enacted statutes prohibiting baby
selling and baby brokering. The statutes regulate the
money that can change hands in an adoption, limiting
payments by prospective adoptive parents to reasonable
amounts for such items as agency or other placement
fees, counseling and attorneys' fees, the medical expens-
es of the birth mother and the child, and the birth moth-
er's living expenses during the pregnancy. Some statutes
also permit the prospective adoptive parents to excuse
child support arrearages owed by the birth parent who
consents to termination of parental rights, at least where
one petitioner is the child's stepparent. Some decisions
permit the parties to excuse support arrearages even in
the absence of statute. See, e.g., In Adoption of C.L.R.,
352 N.W2d 916, 919 (Neb.1984).
The policy behind baby selling statutes is that adop-
tion should be a donative transfer, and not a commercial
transaction in which the birth mother or intermediary
sells a product for profit. Some observers believe, how-
ever, that these statutes are ineffective in preventing an
underground adoption market in healthy babies.
Because the demand for such babies far exceeds their
numbers, desperate would-be adoptive parents may be
willing to pay considerable sums to birth mothers and
intermediaries regardless of statutory proscription.
Baby selling prosecutions are few and far between,
in part because there is usually no complainant unless
the birth mother has second thoughts. Proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is difficult to establish because the
line between proper and improper payments can be
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hazy. Sanctions imposed on birth parents are both quite
rare and quite minor. Courts normally do not withhold
approval of the adoption because unlawful payments
usually surface in private adoptions, if at all, only in an
accounting after the child has been placed. By that time,
courts are loath to upset the child's established
relationship with loving adoptive parents.
Baby selling statutes apply to lawyers who act as
intermediaries in private adoptions. In In re Thacker, 881
S.W.2d 307 (Tex. 1994), for example, the court upheld
disciplinary sanctions imposed on a lawyer convicted of
purchasing five children from the same mother, includ-
ing a set of unborn twins. In affirming Thacker's baby-
selling conviction, the court of appeals found that the
lawyer had paid the birth mother about $12,000 for the
five children. Thacker v. State, 889 S.W2d 380, 384-85
(rex.Ct.App.1994), denying writ of habeas corpus, 999
S.W2d 56 (Tex.Ct.App.1999). The state supreme court
upheld the lawyer's disbarment on the ground that
violation of the baby selling statute constitutes a crime
involving moral turpitude.
Federal and State Subsidies
A significant number of children adopted each year
are classified as "special needs" children.The definition of
"special needs" differs from state to state, but the term
generally includes older children, children of racial or
ethnic minority groups, children with siblings who
should be placed together if possible, children who test
positive for HIV, children who suffered prenatal exposure
to drugs or alcohol, abused or neglected children, and
children with mental, emotional or physical disabilities.
Psychologists recognize that children freed for
adoption thrive best in permanent adoptive homes
rather than in prolonged foster or institutional care.
Growing numbers of special needs children, however,
suffer through multiple foster placements deprived of
permanency for lack of available adoptive homes.
Agency eligibility standards for prospective adoptive
parents are frequently relaxed when an applicant wish-
es to adopt a special needs child, but adoption may
nonetheless remain difficult because parents willing to
adopt and nurture special needs children may face
imposing obstacles, including financial ones, not faced
by other adoptive parents.
In an effort to facilitate adoption of special needs
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children, federal and state law provide financial assis-
tance for parents willing to shoulder the responsibility.
The federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of
1980,42 U.S.C. 5 670-76, created an adoption assistance
program under the Title IV-E of the Social Security Act.
The program provides subsidies for persons adopting
children who have one or more special needs according
to the state's definition, and who are SSI (Supplemental
Security Income) eligible or come from a family that
meets the eligibility requirements of the former Aid to
Families With Dependent Children program as of July
16, 1996. (A child is "SSI eligible" usually because he or
she has a disability.) Eligibility for Title IV-E adoption
assistance does not depend on the adoptive parents'
financial circumstances.
The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L.
No. 105-89, encouraged adoption of special needs chil-
dren by, among other things (1) providing incentive pay-
ments to states whose adoptions of foster children
exceed the previous year's number, (2) requiring states
to provide health insurance coverage for any special
needs child with an adoption assistance agreement who
the state determines would not be adopted without
medical assistance, (3) guaranteeing that special needs
children will not lose eligibility for federal adoption
assistance if their adoption is dissolved or their adoptive
parents die, and (4) prohibiting states from postponing
or denying a suitable out-of-state adoptive placement
while seeking in-state placement.
In 2001, Congress enacted Pub. L. No. 107-16, which
increased to $10,000 a tax credit for all adoptions other
than adoptions of children of the taxpayer's spouse.
Taxpayers who adopt a special needs child are entitled
to the credit regardless of their adoption costs.
Taxpayers who adopt a child without special needs are
entitled to a credit only to the extent of their unreim-
bursed qualified adoption expenses. The amount of the
credit begins to be reduced when the taxpayers' adjust-
ed gross income exceeds $150,000, and is completely
phased out when the taxpayers' adjusted gross income
reaches $190,000.
Various states also allow tax credits for parents who
adopt special needs children. States may also maintain
adoption subsidy programs to assist parents of special
needs adoptees ineligible for the federal IV-E program.
The state subsidies generally cover medical, mainte-
nance and special services costs. Eligibility for state
assistance generally depends on the adoptive parents'
financial circumstances and the child's special needs.
Investigations or Home Studies
In agency adoptions and private placements alike,
adoption acts require at least one investigation or home
study of the prospective adoptive parents. Some states
permit courts to waive this requirement for good cause.
Many states do not impose the requirement where the
prospective adoptive parent is the child's stepparent or
other close relative.
The investigation or home study enables the court
to determine whether the prospective adoptive parents
would be suitable for the child, helps the parents probe
their capacity to be adoptive parents and the strength of
their desire to adopt, and helps reveal factors about the
parents or the child that might affect the adoption. The
investigation or home study may protect the child from
a placement undesirable because of the parents' cir-
cumstances, such as a history of abuse or neglect or the
parents' likely inability to manage special needs the
child might have.
In agency adoptions, the agency must make an
investigation or home study before placing the child
with the prospective adoptive parents, with the child
sometimes placed in temporary foster care in the inter-
im.The agency must follow up with a further inspection
shortly after placement. In private placements, however,
the investigation or home study might not be done until
after the parent or an intermediary has transferred the
child. Public concern about lax regulation of private
placements has led some states to require that, at least
where the prospective adoptive parent is not the child's
stepparent or other relative, a notice to adopt must be
filed mad an investigation or home study must be con-
ducted before transfer. Transfer may not be made until
the parents are certified as qualified. See, e.g., N.Y Dom.
Rel. L. S 115,115-c, 115-d.These requirements recognize
that because of the child's need for continuity, a mean-
ingful post-transfer investigation or study may be
impractical.
Except in stepparent adoptions and other unusual
circumstances, the adoption does not become final until
the child has been in the adoptive parents' custody for a
probationary period which, depending on the state, may
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range from three months to a year. The court signs the
final adoption order if circumstances warrant after a
final home investigation.
The Interstate Compact on the
Placement of Children
Children are frequently moved from one state to
another for foster care or possible agency or private
adoption. In light of the sometimes significant differ-
ences between state adoption laws, movement some-
times results from forum shopping by parties seeking
states with comparatively favorable provisions.
To enhance protection for children moved inter-
state, all states have enacted the Interstate Compact on
the Placement of Children, first proposed in 1960. An
interstate compact is an agreement between two or
more states which is both a binding contract between
the states and a statute in each state. A compact takes
precedence over the state's other statutory law. U.S.
Const. art. I, § 10; United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate
Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452,468 (1978).
The Interstate Compact on the Placement of
Children seeks to protect children transported
interstate for foster care or possible adoption, and to
maximize their opportunity for placement in a suitable
environment with persons able to provide the neces-
sary and desirable level of care. Compact,Art. I(a). Most
decisions hold that the Compact applies to both agency
adoptions and private placements. See, e.g., In re Baby
Girl -, 850 S.W2d 64.68 n.6 (Mo.1993).
The Compact provides that "[nio sending agency
shall send, bring or cause to be sent or brought into any
other party state, any child for placement in foster care
or as a preliminary to a possible adoption unless the
sending agency shall comply with each and every
requirement set forth in this article and with the appli-
cable laws of the receiving state governing the place-
ment of children therein." Compact, Art. 111(a). Sending
agencies must notify the receiving state's compact
administrator before placing a child. The receiving
state's authorities must investigate and, if they are satis-
fied, must notify the sending state that the proposed
placement does not appear contrary to the child's inter-
ests. The child may not be sent or brought into the
receiving state until such notification is given.
The "sending agency" may be either an entity or a
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natural person. Article VIII, however, excludes from the
Compact's scope the sending of a child into the receiv-
ing state by "his parent, step-parent, grandparent, adult
brother or sister, adult uncle or aunt or his guardian and
leaving the child with any such relative or non-agency
guardian in the receiving state."
The sending agency retains jurisdiction over the
child in matters relating to custody, supervision, care
and disposition until the child is adopted, reaches major-
ity, becomes self-supporting or is discharged with the
receiving state's concurrence. The sending agency also
continues to have financial responsibility for support
and maintenance of the child during the period of the
placement. Id.Art. V(a).
Where a child is sent or brought across state lines in
violation of the Compact, the violation is punishable
under the child placement laws of either state and may
be a ground for suspending or revoking the violator's
license to place or care for children. Id. Art. IV. The
Compact does not specify, however, whether violation
may also be a ground for dismissing the adoption peti-
tion, a potent sanction indeed. Decisions tend to hold
out the prospect of dismissal but ultimately refuse to
make children pay the price of adult noncompliance.
See, e.g., In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 701
A.2d 110, 124 (Md.1997).
A persistent barrier to the Compact's effectiveness is
counsel's noncompliance, which may be unintentional
due to lack of knowledge about interstate adoption
requirements. Parties seeking redress for noncompliance
with the Compact may file in the courts of the sending
or the receiving state. Determining the jurisdictionally
proper court may implicate the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act (which has been enacted in all states)
and the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act.
THE CONSENT REQUIREMENT
The Requirement of Informed and
Voluntary Consent
The nature of consent
The general rule is that on a petition by persons
with standing to adopt, the court may not consider the
best interests of the child unless consents to adoption
have been secured from all persons with a right to give
or withhold consent. Receipt of all required consents
does not complete the adoption, but merely enables the
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court to order the adoption if it concludes all other
requirements (including the best interests standard)
have been satisfied.
Knowing and voluntary consent (or as some
statutes call it,"release""relinquishment" or "surrender")
generally must be secured from both birth parents. A
parent may execute a specific consent (authorizing
adoption by particular named persons) or a general con-
sent (authorizing adoption by persons chosen by the
agency, an intermediary or the court). To preserve
confidentiality, general consents are normally used in
agency adoptions.
Consent is not required from a birth parent who is
incompetent, whose parental rights have been terminat-
ed voluntarily or involuntarily, or who has abandoned or
neglected the child for a period specified in the adop-
tion act. If the birth parent is incompetent, the court
may appoint a guardian of the child's person, with
authority to consent in the parent's stead. In some
states, the court in the adoption proceeding itself may
determine whether to terminate parental rights; other
states require that where termination is a predicate for
adoption, the termination proceeding must take place
before the adoption proceeding.
Because valid consent to adoption may terminate
the parent-child relationship, adoption acts require for-
malities designed to bring home to the birth parent the
gravity of consent. In almost all states, consent must be
in writing. The act may specify that the consent be
signed before a judge, notary or other designated officer.
A particular number of witnesses may be required.The
consent may have to be under oath.
Most states specify that consent may not be execut-
ed until the child is born. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 8-
107(B) (not before child is 72 hours old). In some states
this specification applies only to the birth mother; the
birth father (who may disappear during the pregnancy)
may consent either before or after the child's birth. See,
e.g., 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. % 271 1(c). In many states, consent
may be revoked within the first few days after execu-
tion, or within the first few days or hours after the
child's birth. The court then may determine whether
revocation is in the best interests of the child. See, e.g.,
Ga. Code Ann. § 19-8-9 (ten days after signing).
In nearly all states, consent to the adoption must also
be secured from the child where he or she is over a spec-
ified age. See, e.g., Cal. Fain. Code § 8602 (twelve or older).
Some statutes authorize the court to dispense with the
child's consent for good cause. See, e.g., N.M. Stat. 5 32A-
5-21 (ten or older, unless the court finds the child does
not have mental capacity to make the judgment).
Where a child has been conmitted to the custody
of a public or private child placement agency, the
agency's consent may also be a factor. In a few states,
agency refusal to consent divests the court of authority
to grant the adoption. Many states make the agency's
consent a prerequisite to adoption, but authorize judi-
cial scrutiny by providing that the agency may not
unreasonably withhold consent. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. §
259.24(1)(e), (7). Even where the adoption act seeming-
ly makes agency consent mandatory without condition,
many decisions hold that the agency's refusal to consent
is nonetheless persuasive only. The court may grant the
adoption if it finds agency's refusal to consent contrary
to the best interests of the child. See, e.g., In re M.L.M.,
926 P.2d 694,697 (Mont. 1996). Under the familiar judi-
cial approach to review of agency decisionmaking, how-
ever, the court will likely grant deference to the agency
determination because of the agency's experience and
expertise.
Notice
A person's right to consent (or withhold consent) to
the adoption must be distinguished from the right to
notice of the adoption proceeding. A person with the
right to consent, such as a birth parent, is entitled to notice
and may veto the adoption by withholding consent.
The adoption act, however, may also require notice
to other persons, who may hold the limited right to
address the court concerning the best interests of the
child, but without the right to veto the adoption. To
expedite the adoption process, some states provide that
notice need not be given to a person who has executed
a valid consent to adoption. Not requiring notice may
make good sense because the person has no right to
veto the adoption and may be difficult to locate. On the
other hand, not requiring notice may encourage persons
to secure consents from vuinerable birth parents inder
conditions approaching fraud or duress.
Most states permit minor birth parents to execute
out-of-court consents without the advice of their parents
or guardians, other family members or counsel. To help
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reduce the adoption's vulnerability to later collateral
attack, however, the adoptive parents' counsel may wish
the minor to acknowledge her desires in open court.
Forcible or statutory rape
Several states authorize termination of the father's
parental rights on the ground that the child was con-
ceived as a result of a forcible rape or other nonconsen-
sual sex crime committed by him. The father then may
not veto adoption of the child. See, e.g., N.M. Stat. 5 32A-
5-19(C). Courts hold or assume that the federal and state
constitutions impose no barrier to such terminations.
See, e.g., Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P2d 1216, 1237
(Cal. 1992).
Courts disagree about whether termination may be
ordered, as a matter of law, where the child was con-
ceived as a result of a statutory rape in the absence of
force. See, e.g., Pena v. Mattox, 84 E3d 894 (7th Cir. 1996)
(yes); In re Craig "V", 500 N.YS.2d 568, 569
(App.Div. 1986) (no).
The Rights of Unwed Parents
The birth mother has traditionally held the right to
veto an adoption by withholding consent, unless con-
sent was excused by operation of law. Because this right
emanated from the mother's legal right to custody of the
child, the right applied regardless of whether she was
married to the father at conception and birth.The right
was meaningful because the mother's identity is ordi-
narily ascertainable from the birth certificate, hospital
records or witness' testimony.
Before Stanley v. Illinois in 1972, the father's rights to
notice of an adoption and to withhold consent was
another matter. Where the child was conceived or born
during marriage, the father's identity and whereabouts
were ordinarily ascertainable and his consent to adop-
tion was normally required, again unless excused by
operation of law. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S.
545 (1965) (absence of notice deprived divorced father
of due process and invalidated purported adoption by
mother's new husband). Unwed fathers, however, held
no right to notice of the child's impending adoption and
no right to veto the adoption under the federal constitu-
tion or under the constitutions or statutes of most states.
An unwed father could not secure these rights by
acknowledging the child as his own, supporting the
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child, or seeking to establish a relationship with the child
or the mother. As a matter of law in most states, unwed
fathers held no legal relationship to their children.
Stanley v. Illinois (1972)
Joan and Peter Stanley lived together intermittently
for eighteen years. When Joan died, their three children
became wards of the state by operation of law and were
placed with court-appointed guardians. As an unwed
father, Peter was a non-parent - a legal stranger to his
children - who held no statutory right to a fitness hear-
ing before placement. In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972), however, the Supreme Court held that due
process guaranteed the unwed father a fitness hearing
before his children could be taken from him, and that
the state violated equal protection by denying him a
hearing while extending it to all other parents whose
custody of their children was challenged.
Stanley was a dependency proceeding, but it imme-
diately revolutionized adoption law. Previously a
nonmarital child's adoption could be finalized on the
mother's consent alone, regardless of whether the father
appeared now or later to protest. By conferring due
process and equal protection rights on the unwed father
with respect to the child, however, Stanley and its
progeny raised the specter that the father whose rights
have not been terminated (including a father who can-
not be located now) may appear sometime the future
and contest the adoption.
Because Stanley concerned an unwed father who
(as the majority read the record) had maintained a rela-
tionship with his children, the decision left open the
question whether the decision conferred constitutional
rights on all unwed fathers, or only on unwed fathers
who had maintained such a relationship. Stanley itself
sent conflicting signals. On the one hand, the Court
spoke about Mr. Stanley's interest in "the children he has
sired and raised"; on the other hand, the Court suggest-
ed service by publication on absent fathers.
The Court began answering the open question a
few years later in two decisions concerning the consti-
tutional rights of unwed fathers to veto adoptions. The
first, Quilloin v.Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), concerned
an unwed father who had never sought custody or visi-
tation of his I 1-year-old son, had supported the boy only
irregularly, and had had several contentious visits with
Douglas E. Abrams, J.D., et al
him. The Court held that Stanley did not entitle the
father to veto the adoption because he had "never exer-
cised actual or legal custody over the child, and thus
ha[d] never shouldered any significant responsibility
with respect to the daily supervision, education, protec-
tion, or care of the child."
In Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979), a year
later, the unwed father had lived with his two children
and had supported and cared for them for several years
until he and the mother separated. He continued to see
the children often after the separation and continued to
raise them. The Court held that Stanley granted Mr.
Caban an equal protection right to veto the children's
adoption because his "substantial relationship" with his
children was different from Mr. Quilloin's "failure to act
as a father."
Lehr v. Robertson (1983)
In Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), the unwed
father contended that due process and equal protection
gave him an absolute right to notice and opportunity to
be heard concerning the proposed adoption of his
two-year-old daughter by the man who had married the
girl's mother when the child was eight months old. In
the two years between the girl's birth and the adoption
proceeding, the unwed father had never supported the
child, had rarely seen her, and never lived with her or
the mother.
The Supreme Court rejected the unwed father's due
process claim because he had not developed a
relationship with the child. Nor had he entered his name
in the state's putative father registry, which would have
signaled his intent to claim paternity and would have
conferred a right to notice of the adoption. The Court
concluded that the registry "adequately protected his
opportunity to form such a relationship" with the child.
"The significance of the biological connection," Justice
Stevens wrote for the Court, "is that it offers the natural
father an opportunity that no other male possesses to
develop a relationship with his offspring. If he grasps
that opportunity and accepts some measure of respon-
sibility for the child's future, he may enjoy the blessings
of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely valu-
able contributions to the child's development. If he fails
to do so, the Federal Constitution will not automatically
compel a State to listen to his opinion of where the
child's best interests lie."
Lehr also rejected the unwed father's equal protec-
tion claim. Again the Court stressed that unlike the
mother, he had never established any custodial, person-
al or financial relationship with his daughter. "If one
parent has an established custodial relationship with the
child and the other parent has either abandoned or
never established a relationship, the Equal Protection
Clause does not prevent a state from according the two
parents different legal rights."
Lehr (like Stanley, Quilloin and Caban) concerned
children who were at least a few years old when the
adoption dispute arose, and children whose existence
and whereabouts the fathers had known about since
birth.The decisions do not explicitly speak to two recur-
rent questions:
Newborn adoptions. Many transfers of children
to nonrelative adoptive parents occur at birth
or within days (but not years) thereafter. Does
due process or equal protection guarantee the
unwed father a right to veto an adoption before
he has had a meaningful opportunity to devel-
op a relationship with the child?
The "thwarted" unwed father Seeking to
thwart the unwed father's efforts to develop
the requisite relationship with the child, the
mother may place the child for adoption at
birth or shortly afterwards after hiding the child
from him, after untruthfully asserting that she
does not know the father's identity or where-
abouts, after refusing to name the father, after
forging his signature on consent documents, or
after knowingly naming the wrong man. The
unwed father may have a civil damage action
against the mother, e.g., Kessel v. Leavitt, 511
S.E.2d 720, 734 (W. Va.1998) (fraud); Smith v.
Malouf, 722 So.2d 490, 497-98 (Miss.1998)
(intentional infliction of emotional distress and
conspiracy), but damage recovery would not
unravel the father's tangled rights with respect
to the child.
The Court's next decision, Michael H., may suggest
a new approach to these and other constitutional ques-
tions raised by the Stanley line of decisions.
Summer 2001 0 Juveriieia a tradf ollol
A Primer on Adoption Law
Michael H. v. Gerald D. (1989)
In Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plu-
rality opinion), the sharply divided Court suggested that
a state may constitutionally protect a marital union by
disregarding an unwed father who had maintained a
relationship with the child.
The facts were suitable for a soap opera. Carole
(married to Gerald D.) began having an adulterous affair
with Michael H., became pregnant and gave birth to
Victoria D. in 1981.The birth certificate listed Gerald as
the father, and he always held Victoria out as his daugh-
ter. Blood tests, however, revealed a 98.07% probability
that Michael was Victoria's father. In the first few years
of Victoria's life, she remained with Carole but some-
times lived with Gerald or Michael. Victoria lived with
Michael for a total of about eleven months. In 1984,
Carole and Gerald reconciled.
California law presumed that a child born to a mar-
ried woman living with her husband, who was not
impotent or sterile, was a child of the marriage.The vir-
tually conclusive presumption was rebuttable only by
the husband or the wife, and only in limited circum-
stances. The Court rejected Michael's contention that
the statute violated his due process liberty interest in his
relationship with his child without affording him an
opportunity to establish paternity.
The four-Justice plurality (Justice Scalia, writing for
himself, the Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy) rejected Michael's contention that the Stanley
line of decisions conferred a liberty interest "created by
biological fatherhood plus an established parental rela-
tionship," two factors the Court recognized were pres-
ent in Michael's case.The plurality concluded that under
the Stanley line, a liberty interest depends not on estab-
lishment of a parental relationship, but on "the historic
respect - indeed, sanctity would not be too strong a
term - traditionally accorded to the relationships that
develop within the unitary family."
As a matter of law, the plurality's rationale preclud-
ed Michael from establishing a liberty interest because
Gerald, and not he, maintained the requisite relationship
with Carole. Because no liberty interest meant no due
process violation, California's statutory presumption sur-
vived. An unwed birth father seeking to veto an adop-
tion based solely on his relationship with the child
would similarly have no cognizable liberty interest if he
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had not established a legally recognized relationship
with the mother.
Concurring Justice Stevens provided the fifth vote
for the disposition, but did not embrace the plurality's
reading of the Stanley line of decisions, which he con-
cluded "demonstrate that enduring 'family' relationships
may develop in unconventional settings."
Dissenting Justice Brennan (writing for himself and
Justices Marshall and Blackmun) argued that the Stanley
line had "produced a unifying theme: although an
unwed father's biological link to his child does not, in
and of itself, guarantee hin a constitutional stake in his
relationship with that child, such a link combined with
a substantial parent-child relationship will do so... This
commitment is why Mr. Stanley and Mr. Caban won; why
Mr. Quilloin and Mr. Lehr lost... " Dissenting Justice
White concluded that the plurality's synthesis of the
Stanley line"recanted" from the assurance Lehr had pro-
vided to unwed fathers who maintained relationships
with their children.
Putative father registries
Most states enacted putative father registries after
Lehr upheld their general constitutionality.Where a man
believes he is or may be a child's father, he must register
(usually with the state department of health or similar
agency) if he wishes to receive notice of a prospective
adoption. Once the man receives notice, he may seek to
establish paternity and assert his right to veto the adop-
tion.
New York's registry statute at issue in Lehr estab-
lished no time limit within which the putative father
must register to preserve his claim of right. In some
states, however, the statute requires registration before
the child is born or within a specified short period after
birth. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 8-106.01B (before the
child's birth or not later than 30 days after birth). Failure
to register within the specified period constitutes waiv-
er not only of the right of notice but also of the right to
contest the adoption. Registry statutes with time limits
are strictly construed against the putative father, both to
avoid the lengthy custody battles the registries are
designed to prevent, and to protect the birth mother.
See, e.g., Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Servs. Bureau, Inc.,
385 N.W2d 448 (Neb.1986). Strict construction has
been upheld as constitutional. See, e.g., In reAdoption of
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Reeves, 831 S.W2d 607,608 (Ark. 1992).
The wrinkle is that most men remain unaware of
the registry's existence because they are not lawyers,
and most prospective parents do not consult with
lawyers about childbirth. A few states seek to publicize
the registry in places likely to be frequented by unwed
fathers, such as hospitals, local health departments and
other such health facilities, motor vehicle department
offices, and schools and universities. Publicity or no,
however, the putative father's lack of knowledge of the
registry's existence, or of the pregnancy and birth, does
not excuse nonregistration. The rationale is that men
"are aware that sexual intercourse may result in preg-
nancy, and of the potential opportunity to establish a
family." In re Clausen, 502 N.W2d 649, 687 (Mich. 1993)
(Levin, J., dissenting).
Despite the statutory purpose to enable unwed
fathers to protect their rights, registries are not fool-
proof. For one thing, each registry is a particular state's
enactment, without reach or effect in other states.
Assume two teenagers conceive a child while on sum-
mer vacation in state A, then return to their homes in
states B and C respectively.With the help of her parents,
the teenage mother in state C then places the child for
adoption in state D, asserting that she does not know the
father's identity or whereabouts.The father may have no
idea that adoption proceedings are pending in state D,
and registration in state A, the state of conception,
would not protect him.
OPEN ADOPTION
The Growth of Open Adoption
In an "open adoption;' the child has continuing post-
decree relations with the birth parents or perhaps other
members of the immediate or extended birth family.The
continuing relations may include contact through visita-
tion, correspondence, telephone calls, or otherwise.
Informal adoption, frequently with arrangements for
openness, was the norm in the first decades after
Massachusetts enacted the first modern adoption act in
1851. Only in the early twentieth century did states
begin to mandate sealing of adoption records to insure
confidentiality and sever the legal and social relation-
ship between the adoptee and the birth parents.
The walls of confidentiality are not impregnable. In
recent years, the shortage of healthy adoptable children
has helped fuel private adoptions with openness agree-
ments between the birth parents and the adoptive par-
ents. The shortage has given leverage to birth mothers
who seek a future right of contact with the child as a
condition of consent. Indeed, some adoption agencies
facing loss of business now accommodate birth mothers
who seek openness and might otherwise choose private
placements. In light of the Stanley line of decisions,
unwed fathers holding a right to veto the adoption may
also insist on openness.
The growth of private open adoptions has also
resulted from the changing demographics of adoption.
In recent years, smaller percentages of adoptions have
involved newborns and greater percentages have
involved children over the age of two, including special
needs children. More and more children have been
adopted by their stepparents, relatives and foster
parents.The result is that the birth parents, adoptees and
adoptive parents frequently know one another's identi-
ties and whereabouts before the petition is filed. For bet-
ter or worse, the child may have had a relationship with
the birth parents and other relatives that a stroke of the
judge's pen cannot easily undo.
Where practical necessity or private arrangement has
not produced openness, however, confidentiality remains
controversial as a policy matter. For some special needs
and older foster children desperately needing adoptive
homes, the openness option may help overcome judicial
reluctance to order an adoption where complete sever-
ance of ties with birth parents or other close relatives may
not be in the child's best interests. The option may also
help overcome a birth parent's reluctance to consent to
termination of parental rights, and thus may enable the
child to secure an adoptive home without lengthy, and
sometimes bitter, contested termination proceedings.
Openness may also benefit an older child who has had a
relationship with the birth parents or other close rela-
tives. Finally, open adoption may enable disputing parties
to settle contested proceedings without the trauma the
child might otherwise suffer when birth parents and
adoptive parents each hold out to the bitter end for an
"all or nothing" outcome.
On the other hand, openness may deter many per-
sons from adopting for fear they must "share" the child
or might later lose the child. Openness also would some-
times produce continued relationships with abusive or
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neglectful parents, or leave the child confused by loyal-
ties to more than one set of adults.
Disagreement remains concerning judicial authority
to order open adoptions. Some adoption acts authorize
courts to order visitation or other contact between an
adopted child and persons other than the adoptive par-
ents, including the natural parents, when visitation or
contact would be in the best interests of the child. See,
e.g., Wis. Stat. § 48.92(2). Other adoption acts, however,
expressly preclude post-adoption visitation orders
unless the adoptive parents agree to permit visitation.
See, e.g.,Tenn. Stat. § 36-1-121(f).
Where the adoption act is silent about post-adop-
tion visitation, courts disagree about whether it may be
ordered in the best interests of the child. In In re S.A.H.,
537 N.W2d 1, 7 (S.D.1995), for example, the court held
that visitation may be ordered when three factors indi-
cate, by clear and convincing evidence, that it would
serve the best interests of the child: (1) the child's psy-
chological need to know his or her ancestral, ethnic and
cultural background, (2) the effect of open adoption on
the child's integration with the adoptive family, and (3)
the effect of open adoption on the pool of prospective
adoptive parents. Other decisions, however, have pre-
cluded courts from exercising inherent authority to
enter post-adoption visitation orders on the ground that
the adoption act, while silent about visitation itself,
expressly terminates all rights and relationships
between the adoptee and persons other than the adop-
tive parents. See, e.g., In re Adoption of C.H., 544 N.W2d
737 (Minn. 1996).
After Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), a court
order granting birth parents or others visitation with an
adopted child may raise constitutional questions if the
order is opposed by the adoptive parents, who succeed
to the birth parents' rights under the adoption act.
Enforceability of Private Agreements
for Openness
As discussed above, prospective adoptive parents in
private adoptions frequently agree to permit the birth
mother or others to have visitation or other post-adop-
tion relationships with the child. In a few states, the
adoption code expressly authorizes courts to specifical-
ly enforce such private agreements found to be in the
best interests of the child. See, e.g., N.M. Stat. § 32A-5-35.
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In the absence of express statutory authority, decisions
disagree about the propriety of specific performance.
See, e.g., Michaud v. Wawruck, 551 A.2d 738
(Conn. 1988) (written visitation agreement between
birth parent and the adoptive parents may be specifical-
ly enforced where enforcement is in the best interests of
the child); Hill v. Moorman, 525 So.2d 681
(La.Ct.App.1988) (adoptive parents' written agreement
to allow the birth mother reasonable visitation with the
child was unenforceable).
CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS IDENTITY
Transracial Adoption
A brief history of transracial adoption
in the United States
The term "transracial adoption" would describe any
adoption in which the parents and child are of different
races, including adoptions in which the child is white.
Nearly all transracial adoptions in the United States,
however, have involved white parents and black or bira-
cial children.
The first recorded adoption in the United States of
a black child by white parents took place in 1948.
Transracial adoptions increased in the 1950s and 1960s.
Then, in 1972, the National Association of Black Social
Workers sternly condemned transracial adoption as "cul-
tural genocide" and argued that "Black children should
be placed only with Black families whether in foster
care or adoption." National Assoc. of Black Social
Workers, Position Paper (Apr. 1972).Transracial adoption
continues to be controversial, although it is relatively
rare. Compare, e.g., Ruth-Arlene W Howe, Transracial
Adoption (TRA): Old Prejudices and Discrimination
Float Under a New Halo, 6 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 409 (1997)
("[w]idespread, unregulated occurrences of private
placements of infants of African-American descent with
non-African-American adoptive parents place these chil-
dren at risk of alienation from their natural reference
group") with Randall Kennedy, The Orphans of
Separatism: The Painful Politics of Transracial Adoption,
38 American Prospect 38 (Spring 1994 )(" [r]acial match-
ing is a disastrous social policy both in how it affects
children and in what it signals about our current atti-
tudes about racial distinctions .... What parentless chil-
dren need are not 'white 'black,' 'yellow,' 'brown, or 'red'
parents but loving parents").
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Congressional legislation
In 1996, Congress enacted the Small Business Jobs
Protection Act of 1996 (SBJPA), which contained provi-
sions seeking to end the practice of matching adoptive
parents with children of the same race. The legislation
prohibits private and public child placement agencies
from denying any person the opportunity to become an
adoptive or foster parent, or from delaying or denying
the placement of a child for adoption or into foster care,
"on the basis of the race, color, or national origin of the
adoptive or foster parent, or the child." Violations are
actionable under title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
42 U.S.C. § 1996b(1),(2).
The transracial adoption debate will likely continue.
For one thing, the SBJPA does not prohibit agencies from
delaying or denying placement on the ground that the
prospective adoptive or foster parents lack the sensitiv-
ity needed to raise a child in a multiracial family.
The Supreme Court has not decided whether denial
of an adoption on racial grounds would violate the
Constitution. Some hints, however, may be provided in
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (S.Ct. 1984), an appeal by a
white divorced wife who lost custody of her young child
after she remarried a black man.The trial court found nei-
ther birth parent unfit but stated that placement with the
birth father was in the best interests of the child because
"it is inevitable that [the child] will, if allowed to remain
in her present situation and attains school age and thus
more vulnerable to peer pressures, stiffer from the social
stigmatization that is sure to come:
Palmore held that the order modifying custody
violated equal protection. "The Constitution cannot
control [racial and ethnic] prejudices but neither can it
tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the reach of
the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give
them effect."
Native American Adoption
Congress' rejection of race-matching in the SBJPA
stands in contrast to the lawmakers' recognition of
tribal identity in the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978,25
U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.The Act provides that" [iun any adop-
tive placement of an Indian child under State law, a
preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause
to the contrary, to a placement with (1) a member of the
child's extended family; (2) other members of the Indian
child's tribe; or (3) other Indian families." 25 U.S.C. §
1915(b). The SBJPA expressly exempts the ICWA from
its provisions.
An estimated 1,000 to 2,500 Native American chil-
dren are adopted each year. See Joan Heifetz Hollinger,
Introduction to Adoption Law and Practice § 1.05 [2] [e],
at 1-61, in 1 Hollinger, supra.The ICWA seeks to protect
the best interests of Indian children, and to promote the
security, survival and stability of Indian families and
tribes by recognizing Indian children as tribal resources.
25 U.S.C.§§ 1901(1),(3), 1902.
Religion
By statute or case law, courts deciding whether to
approve an adoption are mandated or authorized to con-
sider the religion of the prospective adoptive parents
and of the child (or the child's birth parents).Wis. Stat. §
48.82(3) is typical: "When practicable and if requested
by the birth parent, the adoptive parents shall be of the
same religious faith as the birth parents of the person to
be adopted."
Religious matching raises two fundamental ques-
tions. The first is whether the court may deny an adop-
tion on the ground that the adoptive parents and the
child (or the child's birth parents) are of different reli-
gions. Courts generally hold that where the statute
requires religious matching when practicable or feasible
without creating an inflexible rule of law, the First
Amendment establishment and free exercise clauses are
not offended when religious differences are considered
as one factor in determining the best interests of the
child. See, e.g., Petition of Gaily, 107 N.E.2d 21, 25
(Mass.1952) (religious matching was not practicable
where the physically disabled two-year-old would likely
not be adopted by anyone other than the petitioners).
Some courts have held, however, that the First
Amendment is violated when religious matching is the
sole ground for denying an adoption by otherwise fit
petitioners. See, e.g., In re Adoption of E, 279 A.2d 785
(N.J.1971). Religious differences are less significant
where the birth parents consent to adoption by a peti-
tioner of a different faith. See, e.g., In re Adoption of
Anonymous, 261 N.YS.2d 439 (Fam.Ct.1965).
Should the child's age and maturity affect the
weight the court gives to the adoptive parents' different
religion? Where the child is a newborn or an infant too
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young to express a religious preference, courts may con-
sider the birth parents' preferences for the child, but
these preferences are not determinative. See, e.g.,
Cooper v. Hinrichs, 140 N.E.2d 293,297 (111.1957). Older
children who have practiced a religion, however,
may have interests of their own that merit the court's
recognition.
The second fundamental question is whether
a court may deny an adoption on the ground that a
prospective adoptive parent does not believe in
a Supreme Being. Some decisions have considered a
parent's failure to believe in God as indicating inability
or unwillingness to direct the child's religious and
moral upbringing. However, In re Adoption of E, supra, is
typical of decisions holding that without other facts, a
court may not find failure to believe in God controlling.
"Sincere belief in and adherence to the tenets of a
religion may be indicative of moral fitness to adopt in
a particular case" but "we do not believe that any
reasonable man no matter how devout in his own
beliefs, would contend that morality lies in the exclusive
province of one or of all religions or of religiosity
in general."
INTERNATIONAL ADOPTION
Adoption of foreign children by Americans, largely
unknown before World War II, began in earnest with
returning soldiers and media coverage of the plight of
children and other refugees. The Korean and Vietnam
wars produced heightened interest, which continues to
this day. Proponents believe international adoption
serves the interests of both American parents and the
foreign children themselves. In the United States, "very
few children are available for adoption in comparison
with the large number of people who, for infertility and
other reasons, are eager to adopt.... For most of the
homeless children of the world, international adoption
represents the only realistic opportunity for permanent
families of their own." Elizabeth Bartholet, International
Adoption: Propriety, Prospects and Pragmatics, 13 Am.
Acad. of Matrimonial Lawyers 181, 181-82 (1996).
International adoption is no longer a product solely
of war. In fiscal year 1999, United States citizens adopt-
ed 16,396 children from abroad, a number that exceeds
the number of international adoptions completed by cit-
izens of all other nations combined. Russia was the
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greatest source for intercountry adoptions, followed in
descending order by China, South Korea, Guatemala.
Romania, Vietnam, India, Ukraine and Cambodia. See
National Adoption Information Clearinghouse,
www.calib.com/naic/pubs/fLinter.html (visited June 10,
2001). International adoption accounts for only about
5% to 6% of U.S. adoptions annually, but the numbers are
increasing rapidly.
The Hague Convention on Protection of Children
and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption,
presented in 1993 and ratified by the United States
Senate in 2000, recognizes adoption as a positive
alternative for children unable to remain with their birth
families but unlikely to be adopted in their own nation.
The Convention sets minimal international adoption
standards and procedures to safeguard the interests of
children, birth parents and adoptive parents. The
IntercountryAdoptionAct of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-279, is
implementing legislation that enables the United States
to participate in the Convention and secures its benefits
for U.S. adoptive parents and adoptees in international
adoptions.The Child Citizenship Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-395, confers U.S. citizenship automatically on certain
foreign-born children who do not acquire citizenship at
birth, including children adopted by U.S citizens.
POST-ADOPTION DISPUTES
Fraud or Negligence
A relatively small percentage of adoptions fail,
frequently when the child manifests severe physical or
emotional problems previously unknown to the
adoptive parents, perhaps because the agency or other
intermediary failed to provide them full and complete
information at the time of adoption. Adoption law faces
its greatest challenge when a party sues to recover
damages or annul an adoption for negligence or
fraudulent misrepresentation.
Burr v. Board of County Commissioners, 491 N.E.2d
1101 (Ohio 1986), was the first reported decision to
impose liability on an adoption intermediary for nondis-
closure of information about the adopted child's physi-
cal or mental condition. A number of jurisdictions now
permit recovery for fraud or negligence, or both. See,
e.g., Gibbs v. Ernst, 647 A.2d 882 (Pa. 1994). Some states
have also enacted statutes mandating disclosure of mate-
rial information by adoption agencies.
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Instances of fraudulent misrepresentation by adop-
tion agencies and other intermediaries have evidently
declined since Burr, but nondisclosure and inadequate
disclosure smacking of negligence persist. Periodic dam-
age actions are likely to continue because adoption
dockets include greater numbers of emotionally and
physically disabled foster children and of international
adoptees. Complete information about foster children is
sometimes unavailable because of poor recordkeeping,
rapid turnover of social welfare agency personnel, and
frequent movement of the child from home to home.
Private adoption agencies frequently do not receive full
information from foster care authorities. International
adoptees may have been anonymously abandoned by
their parents or may have come from poorly adminis-
tered orphanages without adequate medical histories.
Annulling Adoptions
Adoptive parents alleging fraud or negligence some-
times seek to annul the adoption rather than recover
damages. A damage action leaves the adoptive family
intact but awards compensatory or punitive damages, or
both.Annulment, on the other hand, makes the adoption
a nullity, and thus frees the adoptive parents of the rights
and obligations that adoption creates.
Suits to annul adoptions tend to arise in three situa-
tions. The adoptive parents may find the child
ungovernable and beyond their effective control; the
child may manifest undisclosed severe emotional or
physical disabilities unknown to the parents when they
adopted; or an adopting stepparent may seek annulment
when he or she later divorces the birth parent.
Except where the adoptive parents appear defrauded
or where other extreme circumstances appear, courts
normally deny annulment as contrary to the best inter-
ests of the child. Annulment is particularly unlikely
where the child has been in the adoptive home for a
substantial period of time, or where the child's likely
alternative is a return to state custody. "[P]ublic policy
disfavors a revocation of an adoption because an adop-
tion is intended to bring a parent and child together in
a permanent relationship, to bring stability to the child's
life, and to allow laws of intestate succession to apply
with certainty to adopted children" In re Adoption of
T.B., 622 N.E.2d 921, 924 (Ind.1993). Because the law
"abhors the idea of being able to 'send the child back"',
id., only a strong showing of fraud will establish grounds
for annulment. Many courts hold that a party may annul
an adoption only where entitlement to annulment is
established by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g.,
In re Lisa Diane G., 537 A.2d 131, 132-33 (R.I.1988).
Adoption codes normally establish a short period
within which finalized adoptions may be challenged.
The limitations statutes, however, frequently reach only
challenges for procedural irregularities or defects in the
adoption proceeding itself. See, e.g., Md. Code, Fain. Law
5 5-325 (one year). The period is not tolled during the
child's minority because tolling would defeat the pur-
pose of the short period, which is to produce finality
that protects children from the psychological trauma
occasioned by disrupted lives.
A few states also create a limitations period for
fraud challenges. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. 5 19-5-214(1)
(one year). Other states have enacted broad statutes of
limitations that reach all challenges. See, e.g., Okla. Stat.
tit. 10, § 7505-7.2(A)(2) (three months).
Where the adoption code's statute of limitations
reaches only procedural irregularities or defects, courts
may permit challenges for fraud or other substantive
irregularity under the state's civil procedure act or rules
relating to vacatur of final judgments generally. The act
or rules may be based on Fed. R. Civ. P 60(b), which per-
mits vacatur on a showing, among other things, of fraud,
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse
party or voidness of the judgment. Under general limita-
tions doctrines, the limitations period for a fraud claim
may be tolled until the allegedly defrauded party
discovered or should reasonably have discovered the





Entry of the adoption decree extinguishes the exist-
ing parent-child relationship, and creates a new parent-
child relationship between adoptive parent and child.
Statutes provide that when the court decrees an adop-
tion, the child is issued a new birth certificate naming
the adoptive parents as the only parents, the child
assumes their surname, and the original birth certificate
and all other sealed court records ordinarily may be
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opened only on court order for good cause. In the
absence of the severe necessity that establishes good
cause, the birth parents may not learn the identity or
whereabouts of the child or adoptive parents, and the
adoptive parents and the child may not learn the identi-
ties or whereabouts of the birth parents.
Confidentiality legislation is grounded in the policy
determination that closed records serve the interests of
all parties to the adoption.The birth parents can "put the
past behind them," secure from embarrassment, and
sometimes shame, arising from the adoption itself and
perhaps the circumstances of the pregnancy and birth.
The adoptive parents can raise the child as their own,
free from outside interference and fear that the birth
parent might try to "reclaim" the child. The adoptee
avoids any shame from out-of-wedlock birth and can
develop a relationship with the adoptive parents. By
serving these interests of the members of the adoption
triangle, confidentiality is also said to serve a state inter-
est in encouraging persons to participate in the adop-
tion process.
Confidentiality statutes lose their force when the
court orders an open adoption, or specifically enforces
a private agreement for such an arrangement. As a prac-
tical matter, confidentiality may also be impossible
where the birth mother insists on maintaining contact
with the child as a condition of her consent, where the
adoption is otherwise concluded informally before the
parties seek the decree, or where the child has had a
pre-adoption relationship with the birth parents or
other relatives.
In the absence of privately negotiated or court-man-
dated openness, however, a vast array of statutes and
rules help assure confidentiality. Adoption proceedings
are not open to the public.Adoption records are exempt
from state freedom of information acts and open
records laws. The adoption agency, the attorneys and
other participants face criminal or contempt sanction
for making unauthorized disclosure.
Federal and state courts have upheld the constitu-
tionality of confidentiality statutes. Even where the
court acknowledges the adoptee's interest in disclosure,
the state is found to have a rational basis for maintaining
the birth parents' interest in privacy, the adoptive par-
ents' interest in finality, and the state's interest in foster-
ing adoption. See, e.g.,ALMA Society Inc. v. Mellon, 601
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E2d 1225 (2d Cir. 1979); In re Assalone, 512 A.2d 1383,
1390-91 (R.I.1986).
"Good Cause"
The good-cause requirement permits disclosure of
identifying information (that is, the birth parents' name,
birth date, place of birth and last known address) only
where the adoptee demonstrates urgent need for med-
ical, genetic or other reasons. Even without such a show-
ing, most states mandate or allow disclosure of an adopt-
ed child's health and genetic history, without revealing
identifying information. Some states also grant adoptees,
when they reach majority, the right to nonidentifying
information concerning their birth parents (that is, infor-
mation about the parents' physical description, age at
the time of adoption, race, nationality, religious back-
ground, and talents and hobbies, without revealing the
parents' identities).
Psychological need generally does not establish
good cause for release of identifying information. In In
re Linda EM. v. Department of Health, 418 N.E.2d 1302
(N.Y 1981), for example, the adoptee unsuccessfully
sought release of her forty-year-old adoption records.
She alleged that her inability to discover her natural par-
ents' identity had caused psychological problems
because 'I feel cut off from the rest of humanity... want
to know who I am. The only person in the world who
looks like me is my son. I have no ancestry. Nothing."
Linda EM. held that "mere desire to learn the identity of
one's natural parents cannot alone constitute good
cause, or the requirement.. .would become a nullity"
The court did state, however, that "concrete
psychological problems, if found by the court to be
specifically connected to the lack of knowledge about
ancestry, might constitute good cause."
Medical necessity may similarly not establish good
cause, particularly where release of non-identifying
information satisfies the adoptee's needs. In Golan v.
Louise Wise Services, 507 N.E.2d 275 (N.Y 1987), the 54-
year-old movant had been adopted when he was less
than fifteen months old. Suffering from a heart condition
that produced a heart attack before the trial court heard
the disclosure motion, he and his attending physicians
asserted that genetic information would assist treatment
and help enable the physicians to evaluate the severity
of his condition.
The adoption agency supplied
all medical and historical informatio
cerning his birth parents, except hi
name and hometown and the name
biological father allegedly attend(
knew his birth mother's name.) Th
disclosure motion, which sought to
duce any records or reports relating
Disclosure Legislation
The efforts of many adoptees t4
parents may be impeded not only
statutes, but also by practical barrier
ing at some adoption agencies may i
search fruitless, particularly after the
Children adopted from orphanages c
after surreptitious abandonment by
may have been subject to no reco
native lands; the abandoned child rai!
birth certificate or other proof of da
Neither statutory mandate nor
however, extinguish the desire of
disclosure. Recent years have witne
advocacy and support groups to assi
to locate their birth families, to chal
tionality of sealed-records statutes,
open-records legislation. Adoptees
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£h consultants and have found new
the Internet.
ive enacted registry statutes, which
identifying information where the
adoptive parents and the adult
eir desire for release. Passive registry
ies to state their desires, and active
thorize state authorities to seek out
ien one party expresses a desire for
without registry statutes, the parties'
.at to disclosure may be insufficient
:ause and overcome the state's inter-
e.g., In re Estate of McQuesten, 578
[.1990).
states now grant adult adoptees an
their original birth certificates, e.g.,
.500, or to the court records of their
ig, e.g., S.D. Codified Laws § 25-6-15.
,2 S.W 3d 919 (Tenn. 1999), the court
utionality of legislation that allowed
t adoption records to adoptees twen-
or older. The court held that the leg-
late the state constitution by impair-
its of birth parents who had surren-
ler the prior law, or by violating the
and procreational privacy and to
ersonal information.
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